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Discretionary Justice and the
Black Offender

Taunya Banks

Introduction

Although formal substantive and procedural laws exist today which govern
almost every aspect of the American criminal justice system, whether a person
enters the system and the treatment the offender receives in the system is
determined to a large degree by the exercise of informal discretionary powers
by public officials at all levels. These discretionary decisions often result in the
development of behaviors, attitudes and policies which are not subject to formal
review through the traditional channels in the legal system.
The existence of discretionary decision-making laws has, in the main,
operated to the distinct disadvantage of the minority offender. The attitudes,
value system, and characteristics of the persons empowered with exercising
discretion and the absence of structures or 'guidelines for reviewing decisions
has contributed to this discretionary justice. Discretionary decisions exercised
by the local patrolman in a real sense determine what laws are enforced, and
against whom. Discretionary decisions made by the prosecutor determine who
will be charged with an offense and what the charge will be. The judge, exercising discretionary powers with respect to sentencing, determines how long a
person will remain in the system.
The use of discretion is available to criminal justice officials whenever the
limits on power involve a choice among possible courses of action or inaction.
With extensive latitude existing throughout the system, there is little doubt that
a very great proportion of all discretionary action in the criminal justice system
is either illegal or of doubtful legality. Unfortunately, discretionary decisionmaking is justified today because of the absence of rules to govern much discretionary justice. Davis (1969) cites two critical reasons for the absence of rules:
(1) the inability oflegislative bodies to fashion rules to govern all situations
that must arise; and (2) the mistaken belief that the individualized justice which
discretion allows produces a more equitable result.
Regardless of the justification for its existence, it is all too clear that
discretionary powers in the administration of justice have been oppressive to
blacks. Police procedures in the black community have been known to differ
from those in the white community. Blacks, for example, are more likely to be
suspected of criminal activity and be arrested. If the alleged offender is known
to be black, police are more likely to make mass arrests of all blacks near the
scene of the crime, something that rarely happens in the white community with
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white offenders. Although release prior to indictment or trial is essential to
adequately prepare one's defense, once a black is arrested, he is not likely to
secure bail. If the offender remains in jail, he is more likely to be indicted
and convicted. Once convicted, the black or minority offender is less likely
to be placed on probation or considered for parole. All of these activities
involve some degree of informal discretionary action by officials in the
criminal justice system.
The root of the problem is deep. Janowitz (1971) describes the scope
of the problem by suggesting that the racial relationship in our country is
very much responsible for blacks being denied equal protection and due
process in criminal justice agencies. As a result, blacks generally have a more
negative attitude than whites toward police effectiveness, courtesy, conduct,
and honesty (President's Commission, 1967).
Statistical data tend to support contentions of discrepancies in the
administration of justice. Although many people inaccurately believe that all
state and federal prisons in the United States have majority inmate populations
of blacks and other minorities, there is no question that the prison population
is composed of a disproportionately high percentage of minorities. According
to the FBI 1973 Uniform Crime Reperts, 26.2 percent of all arrests were of
blacks and 51.3 percent of arrests for violent crimes were of blacks (U.S.
Department of Justice, 1974).
Criminologists in general reject theories that any racial or ethnic group is
more prone to criminal activity than other groups. Some authorities believe
that crime is directly linked to economic deprivation-; cultural nonassimilation,
pure prejudice, differential treatment, and social maladjustment (Barnes and
Teeters, 1959; Bontempts, 1974). This belief can be substantiated, in part, by
Janowitz's findings (1971) that race riots and other racially motivated disturbances are less likely to occur in cities where (1) there is a more racially integrated
police force; (2) there is a more representative form oflocal government; and
(3) there is a large percentage of blacks who are self-employed in retail trade.
All of these factors indicate a degree of economic independence as well as
cultural and social adjustments which reduce frustration in the minority community. However, since these conditions are not so prevalent in many minority
communities, the criminal justice systems must look to other devices to insure
equality of treatment in all situations.
It is, perhaps, naive to think that the mere presence of more blacks and
minorities on the police force, in the prosecutor's office, on the bench, and in
administrative positions in prisons will solve the problem of inequality in the
administration of justice. The employment of blacks in the system will likely
never be in sufficient numbers to drastically affect policy-making. In addition,
the mere presence of minorities, even in significant numbers, is often no
guarantee that discretionary powers will be exercised fairly. In fact, there has
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been evidence that even some black law officers harbor negative feelings about
black citizens (Reiss, 1971 ).
An examination of the mechanics through which discretion is exercised in
four key areas in the criminal justice system will shed further light on the abuse
of discretionary power.

Police

Since the beginning of the twentieth century there has been a tremendous
increase in policy responsibility and activity. The increase has been caused by
the rising number of criminal and regulatory offenses at every level of government. Unfortunately, there has been no equivalent increase in the size of police
manpower. The discrepancy between more responsibility and limited manpower
has influenced the selective enforcement oflaws rather than total enforcement;
it is here that the discretionary powers of the police have been increased and
grossly abused. Police, and especially the individual patrolman, must exercise
some discretion in determining which laws are enforced. Hence, discretion is
influenced by political forces and express~ed community priorities. Consequently,
inconsistent policy decisions of arrest or nonarrest are often made, with differing
results, from one patrolman to another in the same precinct.
Many authorities support the need for police discretion by saying that
discretion is inescapable due to poor draftsmanship of criminal laws, the failure
by legislative bodies to revise criminal codes to eliminate obsolete provisions,
and the undesirability of highly specific criminal laws. All of these reasons are
unsound. Poor draftmanship could be eliminated through aggressive court
decisions voiding vague laws, which could be replaced by legislative bodies with
model criminal codes. Legislative bodies could be required to revise criminal
codes every five to ten years. Finally, requiring highly specific criminal laws
could logically result in the enactment oflaws which could be enforced and
which adequately reflected community sentiment. There is no conclusive documentation that specific criminal laws are impossible or result in injustice. As
law exists today, with no guidelines or principles to guide police discretion,
there is neither total nor equal enforcement of the law.
Perhaps if we lived in a homogenous community the exercise of police discretion would pose no real problem. However, since ours is a heterogeneous
country, police objectives in law enforcement too often fail to reflect the
differences in the cultures of each community. Some limited recognition of the
problem has led to increased attempts to recruit blacks and other minorities
into the police force (Egerton, 197 4 ). The problem still remains that the
interests, needs, and values being enforced in most communities by most policemen are those of the dominant white culture. Law enforcement efforts seem to
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concentrate on protecting the white communities rather than the minority
communities in which residents are more likely to be victims of crime.
There is no question that there is a need to increase police sensitivity
on all levels to the interests, needs, and values of the minority community.
Most recommendations for creating sensitivity have been based upon the
assumption that it is impossible to eliminate or substantially minimize police
discretion. Grossman (1974) suggests creative police training that takes into
consideration the importance of discretionary alternatives and their applicability to a variety of situations, cultures, and subgroups.
In a report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of
Violence, suggestions were made for improving police sensitivity to the
community (Campbell et al., 1970). While there were some excellent suggestions made for improved policy-community relations, their recommendation
showed that they did not realize the danger of allowing widespread discretionary justice to be exercised at lower levels of law enforcement. For example,
one recommendation for handling certain disorders suggested that the patrolman be given a wider range of options (discretion) such as detoxification center
for drunks, family service units for handling domestic quarrels, and community
service information centers to handle complaints. This recommendation only
increases the opportunity for abuses of discretionary powers. The patrolman
would still decide who to detain for drunkenness and who not to detain. In
addition, he would also be allowed to decide who goes to jail for the offense and
who is sent to a detoxification center. The existence of family service units
would still not eliminate the initial discretionary decision concerning which
family quarrels the police will respond to. Lastly, the community service
information centers would be of doubtful aid unless they were structured to
minimize discretion. As long as the employees could determine what complaints to consider or not consider the center would never engender the confidence and trust of the minority community. Procedures such as written reports
stating disposition of all complaints, including reasons for not investigating
some complaints, should be required. These reports should be reviewed
regularly by superiors and made available to the persons who made the complaint.
It is highly probable that discretionary decisions in law enforcement can
never be entirely eliminated, but they certainly can be minimized. The
discretionary power that exists should only be exercised by top level police
personnel. The individual patrolman should be governed strictly by administrative rules. However, corresponding action by legislative bodies directed to
revising and specifying crimes and appropriating funds for increases in the size
of police forces will be needed to effect change at this most crucial level of the
criminal justice system.
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The Prosecutor

Most citizens believe that criminal law operates almost mechanically in that the
formal judicial system is constant and impervious to influences and pressures.
Few realize the tremendous discretion exercised by a prosecutor in deciding
to prosecute, no! prosse, or drop criminal charges against an alleged offender.
Most often the prosecutor is not required by law to prosecute individuals
against whom there is sufficient evidence of criminal conduct. His decision is
based on his own judgment. Few jurisdictions require that any written reason
be given for failure to prosecute .. Even those few states which restrict the
decision to prosecute generally do not limit the prosecutor's power to reduce
the charge, something that frequently happens when there is plea bargaining.
A prosecutor's attitude toward an offender may be colored by many
factors such as economic background, nature of the offense, public sentiment
toward the case, caseload of the prosecutor's office, and the race of the offender
and victim. The typical prosecutor is generally from a middle-class background
and may be easlly influenced by simple factors such as the dress, speech, and
manners of an offender. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice (1967) notes that the prosecutor's response to his
background and attitudes can result tn distortions. A certain manner of dress
or speech, common in another culture, may be perceived as an indication of
moral unworthiness. The prosecutor may also believe that a neatly dressed,
humble person is merely a victim of circumstances. In light of these considerations, it is not at all surprising to find oversentencing and undersentencing to
be an everyday occurrence in our criminal justice system.
Must the discretionary power of the prosecutor be uncontrolled? Kenneth C.
Davis (1969) feels that the German system of criminal justice, were the prosecutors possess no discretion with respect to prosecutions, can be a guide. In
Germany the prosecutor is part of a hierarchial system headed by the minister of
justice. He is directly responsible for his actions to his superiors. In addition,
the German prosecutor is required to prosecute all cases where there is sufficient
evidence. Those cases where the evidence is doubtful must be submitted to a
judge who determines the sufficiency of the evidence and the proper interpretation of the law. The German prosecutor is not allowed to close the file on a
case unless there is a written statement of the reasons. In important cases the
statement must be approved by the prosecutor's superior and reported to both
the victim and any suspect who has been investigated.
There can be little doubt that some of the problems that exist in the operation of the prosecutor's office are due to the fact that most prosecutors are
elected, often inexperienced, and generally politically partisan. Perhaps nonpartisan elections or selection of prosecutors on the basis of merit would reduce
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abuses of discretion, but the human element would still be a factor which could
result in further discriminatory practices. Removal of discretion is still the best
solution for assuring equal treatment.

The American Jury System

Kalvin and Zeisel (1966), in a major study conducted during the 1950s on the
American jury system, found that racial prejudice influenced jury decisions.
Smith and Pollack (1972) inferred that poor and black people are vastly underrepresented in all juries throughout the United States. Nevertheless, the courts
have been very reluctant to interfere with jury selection practices in this country.
In the landmark case Swain v. Alabama (1965), the United States Supreme Court
held that blacks could be tried by juries on which there were no members of
their race. As long as the method used for selecting juries was not a conscious
or deliberate attempt to exclude blacks or minorities from juries, no constitutional rights have been violated. However, the court has refused to seriously
consider other practices which allow racial imbalances in the composition of
juries.
One of the common legal procedures that can be used prejudicially is the
preemptory challenges to remove prospective black jurors from the panel. No
reason for the exclusion need be given. Some might argue that the numerical
limit on these challenges is a sufficient check on potential abuse. However, this
argument is valid only in those jurisdictions with a substantial number of black
citizens who are subject to call for jury duty.
A large number of jurisdictions have used voter registration rolls as a means
of selecting prospective jurors. Unfortunately, blacks, other minorities, and the
poor are not registered in as great numbers as whites and middle and upper
income groups. The result is that poor and minority offenders are tried by
juries which do not adequately reflect their cultural and economic background.
These juries may have little understanding of the offender's life-style or environmental influences and may be hostile toward the offender because of his background.
Since little can be done about jury discretion short of abolishing jury trials,
a possible solution to abuses of discretionary powers by juries lies in restructuring
the jury system. Derrick Bell (1973) has suggested several methods which might
produce significant numbers of blacks and minorities on juries trying cases
directly affecting the interest of minority litigants or the minority community.
He suggested redrawing jury districts in the northern urban areas so that each
minority community would constitute a jury district and require that every jury
be proportionately representative of the black population in the heavily black
areas of the rural South. In addition, it should be required that the jury be
selected in civil cases from the community where the action arose, and in
criminal cases where the crime occurred.
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It will continue to be difficult for minority offenders to believe that they are
receiving equal justice before juries as long as they are judged solely by juries
comprised of persons from different cultural and economic backgrounds. There
may be some merit to that belief. It would be hard for an all white southern
jury to comprehend the contention of a young black political radical that he
shot a policeman in self-defense because he believed that his life was endangered
because he was black. Although they may end up with the same verdict, there
is a chance that a jury composed of some ethnic jurors could evaluate the
evidence without being prejudiced by the color of the defendant or his political
or cultural beliefs. This would truly be justice.

Judicial Sentencing
Judges in the American legal system have almost unchecked powers to fashion
sentences. For example, some offenses are punishable by a fine, imprisonment,
or both; t_he]Udge Iiis tliree options. If the judge chooses imp;isonment, he has
the additional option of placing the oftendef on probation, giving him a "splitseritence" (part imprisonment, part probation), or sentencing the offender to the
full term. Even in the last situation the judge has tremendous discretion in
determining the length of the sentence. Criminal statutes only compound the
problem. The federal kidnapping law, for example, authorizes sentences for any
number of years or for life. This is not at all uncommon, even on the federal
level. Not only are extremely high maximum sentences a problem, but an even
more common flaw is mandatory minimum sentences. This means that the convicted offender often has no way of predicting with reliability whether he will be
released on probation, be given a short term, or be sentenced for a long period of
time. This problem is further compounded by the fact that the United States
Supreme Court has held that it will not review a sentence based only on the
assertion that it was too harsh (Townsend v. Burke, 1948).
Once again, the human factor is a great influence on the length of sentences
and can include such things as geographic background and political or religious
beliefs. Traditionally, judges imposing sentences have considered the gravity of
the offense, the existence of a prior criminal record, and the offender's age and
background. Nevertheless, there are no set guidelines to determine the relevant
criteria to be used and their relative importance. The criteria and importance
assigned them depend in large part upon the individual beliefs and bias of each
judge.
A 19 58 federal statute authorizes the establishment of sentencing institutes
and joint councils on sentencing which are designed to formulate criteria, policies,
and standards for sentencing. The statute is an excellent piece of legislation, but
few jurisdictions have chosen to make widespread use of it. Other attempts to
provide solutions to the problem of sentencing disparities include the Model
Sentencing Act and Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute (U.S.
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Department of Justice, 1975). Both of these codes recommend limiting
judicial discretion. They recommend increased use of probation and fewer
severe sentences. Presentencing investigations are mandatory in certain cases
and the offender has some opportunity to challenge investigative reports.
Severe sentences are to be supported by findings of specified facts which are
to be incorporated in the record. Both codes establish major new categories
such as "dangerous offenders," "atrocious crime" (Model Act), "persistent
offender,'' "professional criminal,'' "a dangerous mentally abnormal,'' and
"a multiple offender" (Penal Code). Each of these terms are elaborately
defined in order to guide judicial discretion.
Widespread discretionary powers for judges may allow "individualized"
justice, but "individualized" justice does not necessarily mean equal justice.
Until better standards are established, blacks and other minorities will continue
to be underpenalized for certain types of offenses involving black crimes and
overpenalized for other offenses including robbery and black on white rape
(Overby, 1972; Bell, 1973). Where there is any discretion, no matter how
limited, abuses will probably occur. Until the courts are willing to provide
appellate review of sentencing, disparity will continue to occur and will most
adversely affect the minority offender.

Conclusion

In order to insure impartiality of treatment regardless of race or economic
status, standards and guidelines must be established concerning the exercise of
discretionary power. The recommendations proposed for controlled discretion
in the administration of justice require legislative action. Because legislators
are reluctant to intervene, it is doubtful that any substantive change will eliminate all the abuses of discretion in the near future. The only other course of
action lies in administrative action by the police departments, the prosecutors'
offices, and the courts. The process may be slow and not as effective as
legislative action. Administrative rules enacted by each of these units would
attempt to establish specific structures and guidelines for the performance of
their discretionary functions. Unfortunately, the police, prosecutors, and the
courts are all overloaded, understaffed, and financially strained. As long as
these factors persist, these units will continue to resist recommended reforms
in their areas.
The future for the black offender looks very bleak because change must
occur in all of these areas before impartiality can be achieved. Without change,
there is little hope of drastically reducing the crime rate among blacks in this
country. As long as discretion is used to the disadvantage of a group because
of race, culture, or economic level, blacks will continue to be discriminated
against in the criminal justice system. It is highly unlikely that the attitude of
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the majority race in this country toward blacks will change sufficiently to cause
them to be truly concerned with black crime and the black offender. It is much
easier to remove from the larger society those persons who have outlived their
usefulness than to seek the means to insure their meaningful participation in
such a society. What is needed is a restructuring of society. Reform measures
are merely bandages, only covering the problems but never really solving them.
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